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Historical Perspectives on Nebraska
Law Concerning Arbitration
Agreements
[I]t is well settled in this state that a provision in a contract requiring
arbitration, whether of all disputes arising under the contract, or only the
amount of loss or damage sustained by the parties thereto, will not be en-
forced, and that refusal to arbitrate is not available to the parties in an
action growing out of the contract.
-Roscoe Pound, Commissioner, Nebraska Supreme Court, 19011
An arbitration agreement is used as a convenient tool to settle disputes
without going to court and to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes.
The grounds for impeachment of the agreement and the decision of the
arbitrators are necessarily narrow, in order to accomplish the public pol-
icy objective of an arbitration agreement. The range of impeachment in-
quiry has long been settled in Nebraska. "An award, whether under the
statute or common law is, in the absence of fraud or mistake, binding upon
the parties thereto, and the burden of alleging and proving its invalidity
rests upon the party seeking to impeach it."
-Paul W. White, Chief Justice, Nebraska Supreme Court, 19752
I. INTRODUCTION
At the common law, voluntary agreements to arbitrate all dis-
putes arising between the parties under the instrument were inva-
lid. Since the landmark decision of the House of Lords in Scott v.
Avery3 in 1856, however, English and American common law rules
have allowed enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate a specific
dispute or type of dispute under the instrument. Nebraska does
not recognize the common law distinction between an agreement
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. B.S. 1951, LL.B. 1953, University of
Nebraska; LL.M. 1957, Harvard Law School. Most of the historical research
was done by Jill Gradwohl, a second year student at Texas A & M University.
1. Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254, 266-67, 86 N.W. 1085, 1090 (1901).
2. Simpson v. Simpson, 194 Neb. 453, 455-56, 232 N.W.2d 132, 136 (1975) (empha-
sis deleted from original) (quoting Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. O'Fallon, 49
Neb. 740, 745, 69 N.W. 118, 119 (1896)). But for a strongly worded opinion of
Chief Justice White against the enforceability of executory arbitration
clauses, see Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 169 N.W.2d 606 (1969).
3. 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (HI. 1856).
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to arbitrate all matters and an agreement to arbitrate a particular
matter.
Nebraska Supreme Court decisions have held that any execu-
tory arbitration agreement can be repudiated by either party up to
the point an award has been entered by the arbitrator.4 In addi-
tion, through a major error of historical analysis participated in by
the legendary Roscoe Pound during his tenure as Nebraska
Supreme Court Commissioner, Nebraska has attributed its ex-
treme restrictions on arbitration agreements, in part, to language
in the Nebraska Constitution. The Nebraska Constitutional provi-
sions to which the restrictions are attributed are direct descend-
ants of Magna Carta obligations5 which remain the law of
England.6 William Penn carried the Magna Carta obligations into
Pennsylvania's Frame of Government in 16827 and from there they
made their way into the constitutions of other states.8 During the
controversial struggle for statehood, they were placed in Ne-
braska's secretly and hastily drawn Constitution of 1866.
Arbitration agreements continue to be entered into frequently
in a variety of circumstances, despite the risks of unenforceabil-
ity.9 Generally, arbitration systems work well because the parties
4. For the precise time at which an executory agreement for arbitration or a
submission to arbitration becomes irrevocable, see text accompanying notes
40-43 infra. For cases allowing revocation prior to an award, see notes 56, 62,
65, 81, 82 & 132 infra.
5. See 1 E. COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTrrUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
45-56 (1809). Article 40 of the Magna Carta read: "We will sell to no man, we
will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." This Article was
merged first into Article 39, the forerunner of due process and jury trial re-
quirements, and then both Articles were merged into Article 29 where they
have since remained.
6. 8 HALSBuRY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 592 (Constitutional Law, Statutory Limita-
tions of the Prerogative § 909, Limitation by Magna Carta) (4th ed. 1974).
7. The texts of the early state constitutions cited in this article can be found in
F. THORPE, AMICAN CHARTERs, CONSTrrUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAws, 1492-
1908 (1909) [hereinafter cited as THORPE]. Frame of Government of Penn-
sylvania of 1682, Laws Agreed Upon In England, art. V (5 THORPE 3060) ('That
all courts shall be open, and justice shall neither be sold, denied nor
delayed."); id. art. VIII ('"at all trials shall be by twelve men, and as near as
may be, peers or equals, and of the neighborhood, and men without just ex-
ception .... ).
8. For the historical development of these provisions in the United States, see
A. HOwARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE 88-91, 203-15, 284-97, 340-44 (1968).
For a current compilation of state constitutional provisions as to sale, denial,
or delay of justice, see id. at 483-84, and for state constitutional provisions
guaranteeing remedies by due course of law, see id. at 485-86.
9. Professor Frank Forbes, College of Business Administration, University of
Nebraska at Omaha, is presently carrying out a research grant from the Small
Business Administration to determine the nature and extent of the use of
arbitration in Nebraska. From the initial responses to 800 questionaires dis-
tributed within the state, 27 indicated a prior involvement with arbitration,
1979]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
honor, rather than repudiate, their agreement to arbitrate. How-
ever, although there are strong arguments in favor of greater use of
arbitration arrangements as a means of dispute resolution, agree-
ments to arbitrate all or any disputes under Nebraska contracts
run a substantial risk of invalidity if either party withdraws prior
to the arbitrator's award.
The single purpose of this article is to recite the sequence of
events which has produced Nebraska's present law concerning vol-
untary arbitration agreements. Since the prohibition against vol-
untary arbitration agreements has been tied to the constitution,
Nebraska, unlike other states,' 0 has severely limited the authority
of the legislature, courts and administrative agencies to provide for
the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
II. NEBRASKA CONSTITUTION OF 1866
The judicial remedy and jury trial provisions of the Nebraska
Constitution, which were relied upon in 1902 by the Nebraska
Supreme Court Commissioners in refusing to enforce arbitration
agreements, were included in Nebraska's original Constitution of
1866.11 They provided in part that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and
every person for an injury done him... shall have a remedy by
due course of law, and justice administered without denial or de-
lay,"' 2 and that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain invio-
late."' 3 The development of those provisions in the Constitution of
1866 does not support the expansive reading they were subse-
quently given.
Attempts to form a constitutional convention had failed in 1860
and 1864 because of strong opposition to statehood. Chief Justice
0. P. Mason, who was present at the secret meetings in an Omaha
law office 14 when the constitution was drafted in January, 1866, and
while 104 indicated no prior involvement. But 115 of the 126 responding to the
question indicated that they would seriously consider the use of arbitration
as an alternative to a lawsuit if the other person would agree. The results of
the study will be presented in a future publication. Letter from Professor
Frank S. Forbes to Professor John M. Gradwohl (December 18, 1978) (copy on
file with John M. Gradwohl).
10. See notes 85-86, 111-17 & accompanying text infra.
11. NEB. CONST. of 1866, art. I, § 5 (4 THORPE 2349) ('"e right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate, but the legislature may authorize trial by a jury of a less
number than twelve men, in inferior courts."); id. § 9 (4 THORPE 2350) ("All
courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his land,
goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and
justice administered without denial or delay.").
12. Id. § 9 (4 THORPE 2349).
13. Id. § 5 (4 THORPE 2350).
14. The accounts vary as to precisely where and by whom the constitution was
drafted, although all reports place the location at a law office in Omaha and
[Vol. 58:438
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who as President of the Council cast the deciding vote in its favor,
later stated: "A small number of men, without authority of law,
drew up the constitution; and the legislature provided for its sub-
mission to a vote of the people."'15
The constitution was not printed for the use of the 1866 Legisla-
ture but it was rapidly considered and adopted in both Houses be-
tween February 5 and February 8, 1866.16 Amendments were not
allowed, and "few of the legislators had more than a foggy notion of
the constitution's provisions.' i7 The validity of the constitution
was drawn in question because of this largely unauthorized proce-
dure and because of requirements concerning equal rights im-
posed by Congress and agreed to by the Nebraska Legislature
subsequent to the people's approval of the constitution in a con-
tested election.18 In a split decision by Nebraska Supreme Court
judges, all of whom had participated in either the drafting or legis-
lative approval of the constitution, its validity was sustained on the
basis that once Nebraska was admitted to statehood, the propriety
of adopting the constitution became a political question not open
to judicial review.19
The Constitution of 1866 was called "a conglomerated patch-
work[;] it is neither the Ohio nor the New York code, which are
radically different from foundation to turret, but is a compromise
between the two with a lot of loose rubbish culled from all the rest
most include 0. P. Mason among the participants. See, e.g., 1 J. MORTON,
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF NEBRASKA 511 (1905).
15. Brittle v. People, 2 Neb. 198, 226 (1873) (Mason, C.J., dissenting). The major-
ity opinion also acknowledged the circumstances under which the document
was prepared:
As is well known, the constitution was originally drafted in a lawyer's
office by a few self-appointed individuals. These importuned the leg-
islature then sitting to submit it to a vote of the people....
: : :Yet we have seen that it was born in a law office, instead of a
convention; that it was made by no one under any authority
whatever; and that it might as well have been made by any one else
as by those who did draft it.
Id. at 211, 214-15.
16. 1 J. MORTON, .supra note 14, at 509-13; J. OLSON, HISTORY OF NEBRASKA 129-30
(1955); 1 A. SHELDON, NEBRASKA: THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 338-42 (1931); 3
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE NEBRASKA CON-
STrrUJTONAL CONVENTION 488-95 (A. Watkins ed. 1913) [hereinafter cited as
NEBRASKA CONSTrTUTIONAL CONVENTION].
17. J. OLSON, supra note 16, at 130.
18. The documents can be found at 2 NEB. REV. STAT. 10-15 (Reissue 1975). See
Lake & Hansen, Negro Segregation In Nebraska Schools-1860 to 1870,33 NEB.
L REV. 44,47-49 (1954); Winter, Constitutional Revision in Nebraska: A Brief
History and Commentary, 40 NEB. L REV. 580-83 (1961).
19. Brittle v. People, 2 Neb. 198,216 (1873) ("When the fact of admission is estab-
lished, the Court are bound by it, and cannot go behind it.").
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of the states thrown in."20 The judicial remedy and jury trial sec-
tions included in the Nebraska Bill of Rights appear to have been
taken from the Ohio Constitution.21
The inferences, if any, which should be drawn from the consti-
tutional history of the judicial remedy and jury trial provisions are
that Nebraska was adopting the general rules of other states.
Thus, Commissioner Oldham's comments in 1902 that Nebraska
had adopted special constitutional judicial remedy and jury trial
rules seem unwarranted.22
The 1866 and 1867 Nebraska Legislatures also adopted or car-
ried forward a number of statutes involving arbitration.23 No rea-
son appears for thinking that the 1866 constitutional drafters or
legislators intended any change in the common law rules pertain-
ing to arbitration agreements or that any peculiar effect be given
the Nebraska Constitution. The Constitution of 1866 could only be
amended following a constitutional convention.24 A convention in
1871 changed "remedy by due course of law" to "remedy by court
of law,''2 but that constitution was not adopted by the people. The
Constitution of 1875 continued the provisions of the Constitution of
1866 on judicial remedy and jury trial without substantial amend-
ment.26
I. STATUTORY ARBITRATION
Arbitration pursuant to a Nebraska statute ("statutory arbitra-
20. 3 NEBRASKA CONSTrUTIONAL CoNVENION, supra note 16, at 495 (quoting an
1869 newspaper comment when a move for a new constitution was under-
way).
21. OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5 (5 THORPE 2914) ('The right of trial by jury
shall be inviolate."); id. § 16 (5 THORPE 2915) ("All courts shall be open, and
every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation,
shall have a remedy by due course of law; and justice administered without
denial or delay.").
22. See text accompanying note 105 infra.
23. NEB. TERR. REV. STAT. ch. 1, §§ 13-30, at 8-10 (1866) (fence viewers); id. ch. 7,
§§ 3-16, at 154-56 (holding and claiming estrays); id. ch. 35, §§ 3-6, at 258
(mechanics' liens); id. pt. 2, tit. 28 §§ 856-861, at 545-46 (general statutory arbi-
tration); id. tit. 30 §§ 989-995, at 568-69 (justice of the peace cases); id., App.
Spec. Laws Relating to Stock, at 731-34 (damages caused by trespassing ani-
mals). The first code of Nebraska in 1867 contained the same provisions.
24. NEB. CONST. OF 1866, amend. § 1 (4 THORPE 2359).
25. 1 NEBRASKA CONsTrrtrrONAL CONvENTION, supra note 16, at 350 (A. Sheldon
ed).
26. NEB. CONST. OF 1875, art. I, § 6 (4 THORPE 2362) ('The right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate, but the legislature may authorize trial by a jury of a
less number than twelve men, in courts inferior to the district court."); id.
§ 13 (4 THORPE 2362) ("All courts shall be open, and every person, for any
injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a rem-
edy by due course of law, and justice administered without denial or delay.").
[Vol. 58:438
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tion") is primarily an adjunct of the judicial process. 27 Some of the
statutory authorizations for arbitration stem from Nebraska terri-
torial legislation. No general statutes for voluntary arbitration
agreements, other than these statutory arbitration procedures,
have been enacted. The decisions involving statutory arbitration,
together with the decisions involving common law arbitration
agreements, make clear that there is presently no legislative power
to provide for the enforcement of executory arbitration agree-
ments, at least to the extent that the arbitration would become a
substitute for a previously existing judicial remedy.
The first Territorial Legislature in 1855 adopted statutes to al-
low the voluntary submission of "all controversies which might be
the subject of civil actions" to arbitration in lieu of judicial deci-
sion.28 These sections were taken from the Iowa Code of 1851,29
27. A number of statutes refer expressly to arbitration or arbitrators. See NEB.
REV. STAT. § 14-1246 (Reissue 1977) (joint bridge commission property); id.
§ 21-1962(1) (foreign nonprofit corporation admission); id. § 21-20,105(1) (for-
eign business corporation's right to transact business); id. § 22-215 (division
of assets and liabilities upon formation of new counties); id. § 25-2103 to -2120
(Reissue 1975) (statutory arbitration of "all controversies which might be the
subject of civil actions, or arising out of a contract with the Department of
Roads"); id. § 28-613(1) (f) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (bribing an arbitrator); id. § 30-
2491(2) (Reissue 1975) (arbitration of secured claim under Nebraska Probate
Code); id. § 30-2653(19) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (power of conservator to settle
claim by or against the estate of the protected person, except wrongful death,
tort or similar claim); id. § 44-811 (Reissue 1974) (claim for loss or damage,
assessment by insurance companies); id. § 52-102 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (sub-
contractor's and laborer's lien); id. §§ 54-403 to -406 (Reissue 1974) (damages
caused by trespassing animals); id. § 67-309(3) (e) (Reissue 1976) (partner-
ship claim or liability); id. § 71-3613(5) (Department of Health under tubercu-
losis statutes); id. § 77-2407 (claims arising out of a contract with the
Department of Roads); id. § 77-2901 (Article IX, Arbitration, Multistate Tax
Compact); id. §§ 77-3301 to -3316 (Interstate Arbitration and Compromise of
Death Taxes Act); id. § 81-1108.26 (state agencies' allocation of heat and
power costs); id. § 84-410 (authority of state surveyor to settle disputed
surveys and boundaries; prima facie evidence of correctness); id. §§ 86-408 to
-410 (acquisition of existing telephone systems by public telephone system).
See also NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-414(2) (Reissue 1975) (venue under Model Uni-
form Choice of Forum Act); id. § 44-1525(9) (K) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (unfair or
deceptive act of insurance company to induce claimant to settle by making
known a practice to appeal from arbitration awards in favor of insured).
Some appraisal statutes amount to extrajudicial arbitration. See, e.g.,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-182 (Reissue 1977) (dissenting state bank shareholders
upon reorganization as a national bank); id. § 8-229 (dissenting state trust
company shareholders upon reorganization as a national bank); id. § 25-1099
(Reissue 1975) (amount of replevin bond); id. § 39-1517 (Reissue 1974) (ap-
praisal of township machinery upon formation of county rad system); id.
§ 54-748 (value of diseased animal ordered to be destroyed).
28. 1855 Neb. Terr. Laws (1st Sess.) 120-21 (1 Comp. Sess. Laws 44-45 (1855-
1865)).
29. 1855 Neb. Terr. Laws (1st Sess.) 55-56 (1 Comp. Sess. Laws 13 (1855-1865)).
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and remain in the present statutes in virtually the identical form
they appeared in 1855.30
The statutes require that the parties to an existing civil cause of
action must sign a written agreement 3l and acknowledge the in-
strument before a county judge.32 Unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, the rules applicable to referees are applied.33 The written
award must be filed in court3 and docketed.35 It can "be rejected
by the court for any legal and sufficient reason, or it may be recom-
mitted for a rehearing to the same arbitrators, or any others agreed
upon by the parties. '36 The award has the effect of a jury verdict 37
and is appealable. 38 If the statutory procedure is followed, the sub-
mission is not revocable by one of the parties alone.39 Otherwise,
the submission is treated as a common law agreement and can be
revoked by either party before the award is made or published.
In Butler v. Greene,4° the court clarified the period of time dur-
ing which a submission to arbitration is revocable. A hearing had
been held before three arbitrators on Greene's claim against But-
ler for loss of Greene's watch and chain which Butler held as a
bailee. No award was decided upon by the group, but the arbitra-
tors' "individual views were disclosed to inquirers."'41 Upon learn-
ing that two of the arbitrators favored Butler, Greene revoked his
submission to arbitration. Later, the arbitrators did enter an
award in favor of Butler by a majority vote. Greene sued Butler in
court and Butler pleaded the arbitration award as a defense. The
court sustained Greene's revocation of the submission since " [t] he
revocation was prior to the written award, and it was also prior to
any definite and conclusively expressed decision of the arbitra-
30. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2103 to -2120 (Reissue 1975). Also, the territorial legisla-
tion setting out civil jurisdiction and procedure of justices of the peace con-
tained very similar procedures allowing the plaintiff and defendant to
consent at any time before trial or judgment to having the cause submitted to
three arbitrators. 1859 Neb. Terr. Laws (6th Sess.) 55, 70-71 (1 Comp. Sess.
Laws 626, 633 (1855-1865)). The sections were carried in the justice of the
peace statutes until the office was abolished in 1973. See NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 27-1001 to -1007 (Reissue 1964) (repealed by L.B. 1032, 1972 Neb. Laws 333,
452-53).
31. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2104 (Reissue 1975).
32. Id. § 25-2105.
33. Id. § 25-2108.
34. Id. § 25-2113.
35. Id. § 252114.
36. Id. § 25-2115.
37. Id. § 25-2116.
38. Id. § 25-2117.
39. Id. § 25-2109.
40. 49 Neb. 280, 68 N.W. 496 (1896).
41. Id. at 285, 68 N.W. at 498.
[Vol. 58:438
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tors."42 If, instead, the panel of arbitrators had actually agreed
upon the result and had given a written award to one of the arbitra-
tors for delivery to the parties, Greene would not have been able to
revoke the submission.43
Territorial legislatures also enacted laws providing for arbitra-
tion of specific subjects, such as damages caused by trespassing
animals,44 the value of care provided stray animals returned to
their owner,45 the dimensions of fences or partitions dividing ad-
joining land,4 and the value of labor or materials giving rise to a
contractor's or mechanic's lien.47 Like court-appointed referees,4 8
appraisers, 49 and 'juries, ' 50 however, these arbitration procedures
were undoubtedly a part of, or in addition to, the state's judicial
procedures and not a substitution for the final authority of the
courts. At least, that seems very clear from the court's adjudica-
tion in 1903 sustaining the constitutionality of the herd laws.5 '
The herd statutes, successors of which are still in effect,52 al-
lowed a person whose cultivated land was damaged by another
person's stock running at large to impound the animals, notify the
owner, and initiate arbitration proceedings. At an early date, the
court recognized that "[t] he object of the provision for arbitration
is to afford a speedy and inexpensive mode of ascertaining the
damages sustained by trespass of stock upon cultivated lands.
Courts construe proceedings of this kind with great liberality in all
matters except as to the jurisdiction."53 But the constitutionality
of these sections was saved by an interpretation that the statutes
42. Id. at 286, 68 N.W. at 498. See Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. O'Fallon, 49 Neb.
740, 69 N.W. 118 (1896).
43. See Hughes v. Sarpy County, 97 Neb. 90, 149 N.W. 309 (1914).
44. E.g., 1855 Neb. Terr. Laws (1st Sess.) 223 (1 Comp. Sess. Laws 94-95 (1855-
1865)). The territorial laws cited in notes 44-45 were adopted in a virtually
identical form on several occasions, and were made applicable to different
counties (or even precincts within a county) or slightly different subject mat-
ters (such as trespassing sheep or cattle).
45. E.g., 1855-1856 Neb. Terr. Laws (2d Sess.) 55-57 (1 Comp. Sess. Laws 228-30
(1855-1865)).
46. 1859 Neb. Terr. Laws (6th Sess.) 95-97 (1 Comp. Sess. Laws 645-46 (1855-
1865)).
47. 1858 Neb. Terr. Laws (5th Sess.) 221-25 (1 Comp. Sess. Laws 532-33 (1855-
1865)).
48. E.g., 1857 Neb. Terr. Laws (3d Sess.) 60-61 (l"Comp. Sess. Laws 334 (1855-
1865)).
49. E.g., 1866 NEB. TER. REV. STAT. ch. 25, § 16 (appraisers to value the property
of an educational institution desirous of becoming a body corporate).
50. E.g., 1866 NEB. TERR. REV. STAT. ch. 36, §§ 1-29 (location, damages, and other
matters in establishing mills and mill dams).
51. Randall v. Gross, 67 Neb. 255, 93 N.W. 223 (1903). See text accompanying
notes 122-25 infta.
52. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 54-403 to -406 (Reissue 1974).
53. Haggard v. Waller, 6 Neb. 271 (1877) (syllabus of the court).
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did not do away with the common law liability of the owners of the
stock and did not deprive the owners of a judicial remedy against
the impounder. Submission to arbitration was determined not to
be mandatory for either party and the award was appealable to a
justice of the peace.5
The herd law decision does little to clarify the permissible lim-
its of legislative authority. As a matter of speculation, it may be
that the legislature can condition a new statutory right or remedy
which does not abrogate a common law right upon submission to
binding arbitration. It may also be that the legislature could au-
thorize or require arbitration arrangements so long as the matter is
subject to the overriding jurisdiction of the judicial system.
IV. NEBRASKA COMMON LAW ARBITRATION
DECISIONS: 1869-1901
A. German-American Insurance Co. P. Etherton: Laying the Foundation
The earliest Nebraska Supreme Court decisions involving arbi-
tration were actions to enforce, or deny enforcement of, an arbitra-
tion award.-5 It was not until 1889, in German-American Insurance
Co. v. Etherton,5 6 that the court dealt with a failure to arbitrate
pursuant to an agreement. One of the insurer's defenses to a fire
insurance claim was the arbitration clause in the policy: "It is ex-
pressly stipulated by the parties hereto that no suit or action
against this company shall be sustained in any court of law or
chancery until after an award shall have been obtained fixing the
amount of such claims, in the manner above provided. '57 This
clause, and the related policy provisions, could have been inter-
preted to require arbitration of all claims under the policy or of
only the amount of the loss. With respect to the interpretation that
the clause apply to all claims, the court followed the traditional
common law rule and its underlying reasoning- "Where a policy
provides that the whole matter in controversy between the parties,
including the right to recover at all, shall be submitted to arbitra-
54. Randall v. Gross, 67 Neb. 255, 93 N.W. 223 (1903).
55. Murry v. Mills, 1 Neb. 456 (1869) (earliest reported Nebraska decision involv-
ing arbitration); Kelly v. Morse, 3 Neb. 224 (1874); Tynan v. Tate, 3 Neb. 388
(1874); McDowell v. Thomas, 4 Neb. 542 (1876); Hall v. Vaner, 6 Neb. 85 (1877);
Sides v. Brendlinger, 14 Neb. 491, 17 N.W. 113 (1883); Graves v. Scoville, 17
Neb. 593, 24 N.W. 222 (1885); Bentley v. Davis, 21 Neb. 685, 33 N.W. 473 (1887);
Westover v. Armstrong, 24 Neb. 391, 38 N.W. 843 (1888).
56. 25 Neb. 505, 41 N.W. 406 (1889).
57. Id. at 507, 41 N.W. at 406. The "manner above provided" was that "'[1]oss or
damage to property partially or totally destroyed, unless the amount of said
loss or damage is agreed upon between the insured and this company, shall,
at the written request of either party, be appraised and determined by disin-
terested and competent persons,' etc."
[Vol. 58:438
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tion, the condition is void. The effect of such a provision is to oust
the courts of their legitimate jurisdiction, which the parties cannot
do."58
The insurance company had interpreted the clause to apply to
"the amount of loss, or sum to which the assured may be enti-
tled."59 The court avoided the question of the validity of a policy
provision requiring arbitration of the amount of loss only. Reading
the policy alternatively as requiring arbitration "where the sole
question between the parties to the policy was as to the amount of
indebtedness," it held that the insurance company could not in-
voke the arbitration clause since it did not admit liability under the
policy.60 This distinction, however, was not expressed in the sylla-
bus of the case which stated in general terms that "[a] provision in
a policy that no suit or action against the insurer 'shall be sus-
tained in any court of law or chancery until after an award shall
have been obtained' by arbitration, Tudng the amount' due after
loss, is void, the effect of such provision being to oust the courts of
their legitimate jurisdiction."'61
During the next few years, the defense of failure to arbitrate
was rejected in a line of insurance cases.62 In addition to following
the rationale of German-American Insurance Co. v. Etherton, the
court held that the arbitration clauses violated the valued policy
law6 3 where there was a total loss.64
B. Schrandt v. Young: Commissioner Pound's Initial Dicta
The first Nebraska case to present a failure-to-arbitrate defense
in a general contract matter was Schrandt v. Young65 decided by
58. Id. at 508, 41 N.W. at 4G6.
59. Brief for Plaintiff In Error at 3, 49 Nebraska Briefs (Neb. State Lib.):
These provisions secure that the amount of loss, or the sum to which
the assured may be entitled shall never be the subject of controversy
in the courts but shall be determined by agreement or arbitration,
and the action must be for the amount thus determined, and can be
for nothing else.
60. 25 Neb. at 508, 41 N.W. at 406.
61. Id. at 505, 41 N.W. at 406 (syllabus of the court).
62. Union Ins. Co. v. Barwick, 36 Neb. 223,54 N.W. 519 (1893); German Ins. Co. v.
Eddy, 36 Neb. 461,54 N.W. 856 (1893); Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Bean, 42 Neb. 537,
60 N.W. 907 (1894); National Masonic Accident Ass'n v. Burr, 44 Neb. 256, 62
N.W. 466 (1895); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Bachler, 44 Neb. 549, 62 N.W. 911
(1895); Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 47 Neb. 138, 66 N.W. 278 (1896); Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 49 Neb. 811, 69 N.W. 125 (1896).
63. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-380 (Reissue 1974). The statute provides in part that
"the amount of insurance written on [the] policy shall be taken conclusively
to be the true value of the property insured."
64. Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Bean, 42 Neb. 537,60 N.W. 907 (1894); German Ins. Co. v.
Eddy, 36 Neb. 461, 54 N.W. 856 (1893).
65. 62 Neb. 254,86 N.W. 1085 (1901).
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Commissioner Roscoe Pound in 1901. In Schrandt, plaintiff initi-
ated an action of replevin for sheep placed with defendant for care
under a written contract. A jury found for defendant on the merits
and the main issues on appeal centered on the damages plaintiff
owed defendant for wrongfully taking possession from defendant
by replevin. The contract for care of the sheep contained a provi-
sion for arbitration:
In the event of difficulty between arties of this contract in settling or
dividing wool or increase, party of the first part may choose an arbitrater
and party of the second prt choose an arbitrater and the two arbitraters so
chosen shall choose a third arbitrater and said arbitrater shall determine
the interests of the agistment under the terms of this contract and the
number of sheep and lambs or pounds of wool, the price or value of sheep
or lambs, or wool belonging to the interest of party of the second partand
party of the first part may at his option pay to said party of the second part
the value of said interest or may deliver to said party the number of sheep
and pounds of wool so determined by said arbitraters, party of the first
part agrees at the terminationof this contract to make and deliver to the
prty of the second part a good and sufficient bill of sale to the one-half
(1/2) of the increase of said herd after the original number of sheep shall-
have been made good as hereinbefore provided.
66
The lower court excluded all evidence of the arbitration clause and
plaintiff's demand for arbitration. Commissioner Pound dealt with
the arbitration issue in a single classic sentence appearing near
the end of the otherwise lengthy opinion:
Whatever distinction may be made elsewhere between arbitration gener-
ally and arbitration as to damages only, it is well settled in this state that a
provision in a contract requiring arbitration, whether of all disputes aris-
ing under the contract, or only of the amount of loss or damage sustained
by the parties thereto, will not be enforced, and that refusal to arbitrate is
not available to the parties in an action growing out of the contract.
67
There was a clear basis for the court's avoiding any statement
as to the validity of "arbitration as to damages only". The action
was for replevin. As a defense in that action, the arbitration provi-
sion might easily have been interpreted as an "all disputes" clause.
Defendant's position was essentially one of "no liability" as in Ger-
man-American Insurance Co. v. Etherton.6 The parties had met
and agreed upon an arbitrator.69 Later, after bringing replevin and
regaining possession, plaintiff moved to have the case referred to
arbitration.7 0 Plaintiffs brief distinguished prior Nebraska deci-
sions on the ground that the clause involved "was simply as to the
66. Transcript of Schrandt v. Young, No. 9,585 (Office of the Clerk, Nebraska
Supreme Court) (attached to Defendant's Answer) (misspellings in origi-
nal); Brief for Plaintiffs In Error at 2-3, 196 Nebraska Briefs (Neb. State Lib.).
67. Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254, 266-67, 86 N.W. 1085, 1090 (1901).
68. 25 Neb. 505, 41 N.W. 406 (1889). See notes 59-61 & accompanying text supra.
69. Brief for Plaintiffs In Error at 3, 196 Nebraska Briefs (Neb. State Lib.).
70. Id. at 2.
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amount of damages, and not as to the liability."7' Defendant did
not argue the "arbitration as to damages only" issue on the merits,
but contended simply that since plaintiff had already initiated re-
plevin and taken possession of the sheep, defendant was entitled
to defend in the tribunal chosen by plaintiff.72 Additionally, plain-
tiff's motion was to consolidate that proceeding with another and
refer both to arbitration, which defendant argued was not feasi-
ble.73 Commissioner Pound might have avoided making the state-
ment regarding "arbitration of damages only" by interpreting the
clause as an all disputes clause, by treating the defense as one de-
nying liability, or by sustaining one of defendant's apparently valid
defenses on the issue.
Commissioner Pound's language "well settled in this state"
seems suspect. All of the previous decisions involved insurance
agreements,74 and none expressly addressed the bald issue of en-
forceability of an arbitration clause as to amount of loss only.75 In
German-American Insurance Co. v. Etherton, the court avoided de-
ciding this issue because the insurer denied liability under the pol-
icy. The subsequent decisions were grounded on the Etherton
precedent and similarly contained an alternative basis for deci-
sion. The single authority cited by Commissioner Pound as sup-
port for his entire ruling as to arbitration was National Masonic
Accident Association v. Burr.76 In Burr, the arbitration clause,
which was contained in the articles of incorporation of the mutual
insurance association, was a contract to arbitrate any disputed
claim.77 Additionally, the Association defended the claim on the
ground that plaintiff had not paid a prior assessment, thus causing
the coverage to lapse prior to the accident. 78 The authorities upon
which the court's decision in Burr relied similarly involved alter-
71. Id. at 3.
72. Memorandum Brief for Defendant In Error at 5, 196 Nebraska Briefs (Neb.
State Lib.).
73. Id.
74. See cases cited in notes 56 & 62 supra.
75. See notes 55-64 & accompanying text supra.
76. 44 Neb. 256,62 N.W. 466 (1895) (cited in Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254,267,86
N.W. 1085, 1090 (1901)).
77. Id. at 262-63, 62 N.W. at 468:
Disputed claims shall be adjusted as follows: Should such a claim
arise it shall be referred to a committee of three, all of whom shall be
master Masons, one to be chosen by the assured or his representa-
tive, one by the association, and the two so chosen shall select the
third; none of whom shall be relatives of the assured or have any
pecuniary interest in the claim. No suit shall be brought upon any
disputed claim before the same shall have been arbitrated by such
committee; and the award of such committee shall be final and con-
clusive upon the claimant and the association.
78. Id. at 263, 62 N.W. at 468.
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native bases for their results.7 9 None of these Nebraska decisions
was clear authority for Commissioner Pound's phrase in Schrandt
that agreements to arbitrate "only ... the amount of loss or dam-
age sustained" would not be enforced.
On this issue, Commissioner Pound's opinion does not cite, nor
do any of the other cases in this line of decisions cite, the cases
involving an agreement to arbitrate a claim which might be the
subject of a civil action but in which the statutory arbitration pro-
cedures were not followed.80 These decisions might have provided
some precedent for the decision in Schrandt, but the issue on
which Commissioner Pound wrote scarcely seems to have been
"well settled" at that time. It did, however, become very well set-
tled just eighteen months later, in part due to this language in
Schrandt.
Up to this point, the Nebraska decisions had rested solely on
common law considerations. There was no citation or discussion
of Nebraska statutes or constitutional provisions in these early de-
cisions.
V. THE COMMISSIONERS' DECISIONS OF 1902
A. Grounding the Refusal to Enforce Arbitration Agreements in the
Nebraska Constitution
The Nebraska Supreme Court first squarely addressed the is-
sue of the validity of executory arbitration agreements pertaining
to a single subject in two Commissioners' decisions adopted by the
court on December 3, 1902. The deficiencies of the judicial analysis
in these decisions lie not so much in the substantive outcomes of
the cases but in the attribution of the holdings to the Nebraska
Constitution. It is this constitutional stranglehold on the enforce-
ability of voluntary arbitration agreements, placing the subject be-
yond legislative, judicial or administrative determination, which
has left Nebraska arbitration agreements in precarious legal and
practical circumstances.
Both Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Hon8l and Phoenix Insur-
ance Co. v. Zlotky 82 arose under the New York Standard Form fire
insurance policy.83 The lower courts rejected failure to arbitrate
79. Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Bean, 42 Neb. 537, 60 N.W. 907 (1894) (valued policy
law); Union Ins. Co. v. Barwick, 36 Neb. 223,54 N.W. 519 (1893) (denial of lia-
bility); German-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 505,41 N.W. 406 (1889)
(denial of liability).
80. See, e.g., Butler v. Greene, 49 Neb. 280, 68 N.W. 496 (1896).
81. 66 Neb. 555, 92 N.W. 746 (1902).
82. 66 Neb. 584, 92 N.W. 736 (1902).
83. Id. at 585, 92 N.W. at 736:
In the event of disagreement as to the amount of the loss the same
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defenses. On appeal, the insurers presented an imposing number
of state and federal decisions which had followed the English
precedents in sustaining the validity of the New York Standard
Form. The claimants argued almost exclusively from the prior
Nebraska cases.84 The briefs did not cite any provisions of the Ne-
braska Constitution. Hartford Fire was decided by Commission-
ers Kirkpatrick and Hastings of Department 1 and Phoenix
Insurance by Commissioner Oldham of Department 2, with Com-
missioner Pound concurring in a separate opinion.
The Commissioners' opinions recognized that there were
"many"8 5 or "numerous"8 6 federal and state court decisions distin-
guishing agreements to arbitrate damages only from agreements
to arbitrate all disputes. No contrary authority was cited in the
opinions. Faced with the difficult problem of prior Nebraska dicta
at variance with overwhelming precedent elsewhere, the Commis-
sioners apparently reached on their own for the Nebraska Consti-
tution. In order to avoid the impact of precedents from other
jurisdictions, they based the holdings on the Nebraska Constitu-
tion. The chain of analysis proceeds along different lines in the
two cases but both are grounded on the Nebraska Constitution's
judicial remedy and right to trial by jury provisions. 87 The opin-
ions wrongly relied on a surface glimpse of the face of the constitu-
tional language without placing the constitutional provisions in
their proper perspectives within Nebraska jurisprudence and
within the law of other jurisdictions.
shall, as above provided, be ascertained by two competent and disin-
terested appraisers, the insured and this company each selecting
one, and the two so chosen shall first select a competent and disinter-
ested umpire; the appraisers together shall then estimate and ap-
praise the loss, stating separately sound value and damage, and
failing to agree, shall submit their differences to the umpire; and the
award in writing of any two shall determine the amount of such loss.
* * * No suit or action on this policy, for the recovery of any claim,
shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity until after full com-
pliance by the insured with all the foregoing requirements.
84. The briefs in both cases can be found in 257 Nebraska Briefs (Neb. State
Lib.).
85. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Hon, 66 Neb. 555, 562-63, 92 N.W. 746, 749 (1902) ("We
are not unmindful of the fact that there are many cases in both federal and
state courts recognizing the distinction sought to be maintained here.").
86. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 66 Neb. 584, 586, 92 N.W. 736, 736 (1902) ("[I]t is
contended that a different rule applies when the agreement is for the arbitra-
tion of but one question, i.e., the amount of damage. Numerous cases are
cited from both the state and federal courts tending to support this conten-
tion . ... ).




The judicial analysis in Hartford Fire begins with an elabora-
tion of the "any dispute" holding of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Insurance Co. v. Morse,88 a leading authority re-
lied upon in German-American Insurance Co. v. Etherton. The
opinion does not note, however, that subsequently in Hamilton v.
Liverpool, London & Globe Insurance Co.89 the United States
Supreme Court had expressly sustained an agreement to arbitrate
the amount of loss or damage under a fire insurance policy. In
Hamilton, the Court stated.
Such a stipulation, not ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, but leaving
the general question of liability to be judicially determined, and simply
providing a reasonable method of estimating and ascertaining the amount
of the loss, is unquestionably valid, according to the uniform current of
authority in England and in this country.90
The analysis in Hartford Fire then proceeds to attribute the in-
validity of an agreement to arbitrate all disputes to the judicial
remedy provision of the Nebraska Constitution.91 It reasoned that
if an agreement to arbitrate all disputes is offensive, then so is an
agreement to arbitrate a pivotal or substantial issue of contro-
versy, since "courts will not lend their aid in the enforcement of
contracts the effect of which would be to clse their doors to suit-
ors who would otherwise be entitled to their protection."92 Fur-
ther, the opinion states, to the extent the agreement relates to the
ascertainment of the amount of loss, it violates the Nebraska Con-
stitution's right to trial by jury.93 The opinion traces the holdings
of other jurisdictions to the House of Lords' decision in Scott v.
88. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874).
89. 136 U.S. 242 (1890).
90. Id. at 255.
91. 66 Neb. at 556, 558, 92 N.W. at 747:
It is an incident of every contract that a breach on the part of one
of the parties thereto gives to the other a cause of action enforceable
in a court of law or equity; and an agreement between parties to a
contract that neither shall maintain a suit thereon after breach-any
differences to be settled by arbitration-is without binding force, as
tending to oust the jurisdiction of the courts.... The provision
found in the constitution of the state... embodies the same general
proposition: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for any in-
jury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have a
remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without de-
nial or delay." Thus it will be seen that a stipulation that no suit shall
be maintainable upon the contract after breach, is void. This propo-
sition, we understand, is conceded in the case at bar; and if the stipu-
lation above quoted results in ousting the courts of jurisdiction, it
must be held unenforceable.
92. 66 Neb. at 562, 92 N.W. at 749.
93. Id. at 561, 92 N.W. at 749.
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Avery,94 which it finds to be "unsound"95 and impractical. 96 It
cites the syllabus in German-American Insurance Co. v. Etherton
97
as having been the law of the damages-only arbitration issue,98
seizing upon the insurer's erroneous claim that the case actually
was determined by the valued policy law (which was not yet in
effect), 99 and ignoring the denial of liability point upon which the
opinion of the court had actually rested its decision. It found this
doctrine to have "been assumed to be firmly established in the
body of our law"'0 0 and to have "become a rule of property."'U0
Still, Hartford Fire might have been decided as a common law
case to effectuate the court's fundamental policy expressed
throughout the opinion: "It seems clear to us that an agreement
which deprives a party of a right to the protection of the courts
upon a single question, which may be the question of greatest im-
portance in the controversy, violates the principle involved to the
same extent as would an agreement requiring all matters to be
submitted."' 02 Had the decision proceeded merely on this com-
mon law approach, it would not have locked the result into the Ne-
braska Constitution. As it was, the decision not only misread and
failed to properly apply the precedents of other jurisdictions but
also limited the authority of the state's legislative, judicial and ad-
ministrative agencies to deal effectively with the issue later on.
94. 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (H.L. 1856).
95. 66 Neb. at 563, 92 N.W. at 749: "We have made a very careful examination of
the arguments advanced in the several opinions given by the lords in support
of the conclusion reached by the majority, and with all due respect, are forced
to the conclusioii that the position taken is unsound."
96. Id. at 563-64, 92 N.W. at 749-50:
Upon what sound reason can it be said that an agreement to submit
one or two of the questions in controversy can be sustained? As we
have seen, the one or two questions may be the questions of vital
importance, and the third question may sink into insignificance, or
may be entirely eliminated by the arbitration of the two questions.
Or suppose ten questions are in controversy. Will the courts say that
a contract to submit nine is valid and will be enforced, so long as the
party has one question left, concerning which he has a right to be
heard in the courts? Of course, the one remaining question may be
of minor importance, and the party may not desire to go into the
courts upon that .... The distinction made by the learned lords in
Scott v. Avery, does not rest upon sound principles. It is a difference
in degree rather than in kind.
97. For text of syllabus, see text accompanying note 61 supra.
98. 66 Neb. at 564-65, 92 N.W. at 750.
99. Id. at 565, 92 N.W. at 750.
100. Id.
101. Id.




Phoenix Insurance is a shorter opinion. In examining the com-
mon law distinction between agreements to arbitrate solely the
amount of damage and agreements to arbitrate all matters, the
opinion initially strikes directly at Scott v. Avery,103 since the rea-
soning of the state and federal cases was founded on this "leading
case."'104 The opinion states:
Long after the announcement of the opinion in Scott v. Avery.... the
people of the State of Nebraska adopted a constitution containing a Bill of
Rights, enumerated among which were that "the right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate," and that "all courts shall be open, and every person, for
any injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a
remedy by due course of law," etc.
10 5
This statement, however, overlooks several important factors: the
presence of the Magna Carta judicial remedy and right of trial by
jury provisions in English law; the murky history of the Nebraska
Constitution of 1866 which brought the requirement into Nebraska
law; and the presence of similar constitutional provisions in other
states which have followed the reasoning of Scott v. Avery.l0 6
The Phoenix Insurance opinion then determines that the lan-
guage of the syllabus in German-American Insurance Co. v.
Etherton10 7 was a "solemn adjudication of a question then in issue
before the court."'108 The opinion concludes:
We have no disposition to change a rule of this court which is in harmony
with the genius and spirit of our constitution, and which has entered into
every contract of insurance made in this state since its announcement,
sixteen years ago, merely for the purpose of putting ourselves in closer
touch with the House of Lords. There is no better reason for upholding a
contract that in advance ousts the jurisdiction of a court of law from find-
ing the amount of damage in a dispute between assured and insurer, than
there would be for upholding contracts ousting the jurisdiction of courts
on any other question that might arise between them; and whenever we
say that the jurisdiction of courts may be contracted away in advance on
103. 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (HI.. 1856).
104. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 66 Neb. 584, 586, 92 N.W. 736, 736-37 (1902).
105. Id. at 586, 92 N.W. at 737.
106. 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (H.L. 1856).
107. For text of syllabus, see text accompanying note 61 supra.
108. 66 Neb. at 587, 92 N.W. at 737:
We can not agree with counsel for the insurance companies that this
long line of decisions rests on a mere dictum of the court in the case
of German-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton .... and that the question
now at issue was not properly before the court .... The right of
appraisal as a condition precedent to the right of action in a court of
law, was an issue as well defined in German-American Ins. Co. v.
Etherton .... as it is in the case now pending; and the rule in that
case, instead of announcing a mere dictum, is a solemn adjudication
of a question then in issue before the court.
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any question, we open a leak in the dyke of constitutional guarantees
which might some day carry all away.
10 9
Commissioner Pound concurred in a brief opinion which spoke
to several issues involved in the court's determination. His entire
opinion reads:
I do not think the constitutional provision with reference to trial by
jury has any bearing upon the question involved in this case. The same
provision is to be found in the constitution of the United States and in the
constitutions of the several states. Notwithstanding these provisions and
the jealousy with which the right of trial by jury is guarded by the federal
courts, those courts and most of the state courts uphold the distinction
between an agreement to arbitrate the whole matter in dispute and an
agreement for arbitration of the amount of loss or damage only, as made in
the case of Scott v. Avery. Were the question a new one, I do not believe
this court would take the stand to which it is now committed. But every
court, in the course of time, develops some peculiar doctrines with respect
to which it differs from others of coordinate jurisdiction. Where these pe-
culiar doctrines work no harm, certainty and consistency are no less im-
portant than agreement with other courts. The rule in question has been
announced so many times that it may be said to have entered into the
contracts in force in this state, and is commonly understood by all persons
to govern the agreements which they make. It is by no means a bad rule
and I see no reason to believe that it operates unjustly.
I am therefore of the opinion that the rule ought to be adhered to, and
that the judgment should be af(lrmed. 1 10
Commissioner Pound was correct that the constitutions of the
United States"' and all of the previously admitted states 1 2 con-
109. Id. at 587-88, 92 N.W. at 737.
110. Id. at 588-89, 92 N.W. at 737-38 (Pound, C., concurring).
111. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
112. ALA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 12 (1 THORPE 118); ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. Il, § 6
(1 THORPE 289); CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 3 (1 THORPE 391); CONN. CONST. of
1818, art. I, § 21 (1 THORPE 538); DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. I, § 7 (1 THORPE 583);
FiA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 6 (1 THORPE 686); GA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 8 (1
THORPE 810); ILT CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 6 (2 THORPE 981); IND. CONST. of
1851, art I, § 20 (2 THORPE 1075); IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 9 (2 THORPE
1137); KAN. CONST. of 1855, art. Bill of Rights, § 5 (2 THORPE 1242); KY. CONST.
of 1850, art XIII, § 8 (3 THORPE 1313); LA. CONST. of 1864, tit. VII, art. 105 (3
THORPE 1442); ME. CoNsT. of 1864, Declaration of Rights, XIX (3 THORPE 1743);
MAss. CONST. of 1789, pt. I, XV (3 THORPE 1891-92); MIcH. CONST. of 1850, art.
VI, § 27 (4 THORPE 1956); MiNN. CONST. of 1857, art I, § 4 (4 THORPE 1992); MISS.
CONST. of 1832, art. I, § 28 (4 THORPE 2051); Mo. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 17 (4
THORPE 2193); NEV. CoNsT. of 1864, art. I, § 3 (4 THORPE 2402); NIL CONST. of
1792, art XX (4 THORPE 2473-74); N.J. CoNsT. of 1844, art I, § 7 (5 THORPE
2600); N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 2 (5 THORPE 2653); N.C. CONST. of 1776, Dec-
laration of Rights, XIV (5 THORPE 2788); OHIO CONST. of 1851, art I, § 5 (5
THORPE 2914); ORE. CoNsT. of 1857, art. I, § 18 (5 THORPE 2999); PA. CONST. of
1838, art. IX, § 6 (5 THORPE 3113); R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 15 (6 THORPE
3224); S.C. CONST. of 1865, art. IX, § 7 (6 THORPE 3278); TENN. CONST. of 1834,
art. I, § 6 (6 THORPE 3427); TEX. CONST. of 1866, art I, § 8 (6 THORPE 3570); VT.
CoNST. of 1793, ch. I, art. 10 (6 THORPE 3763); VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights,
§ 11 (7 THORPE 3814); W. VA. CONST. of 1861-1863, art. I, §§ 7-8 (7 THORPE 4015);
WiS. CONST. of 1848, art. I, § 5 (7 THORPE 4077).
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tained a right to trial by jury. It is a serious deficiency in Commis-
sioner Pound's concurrence that he did not carry his analysis
similarly to the judicial remedy provision in the Nebraska Consti-
tution. The constitutions of at least twenty-five of the thirty-six
states admitted prior to Nebraska contained virtually identical pro-
visions for a judicial remedy by due course of law at the time Ne-
braska became a state on March 1, 1867.113 In addition, three of the
previously admitted states" 4 and all eight states admitted be-
tween 1867 and 1902115 had such a constitutional provision when
Commissioner Pound concurred in Phoenix Insurance. By that
time, thirty-seven states in addition to Nebraska had a similar
state constitutional requirement of a judicial remedy. The briefs of
the insurers in Hartford Fire and Phoenix Insurance cited cases
from many of these states," 6 including Ohio" 7 from which Ne-
113. The language in twenty-five state constitutions was identical to or expressed
in the same general fashion as in the Nebraska Constitution. AL. CONST. of
1865, art. I, § 14 (1 THORPE 118); CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 12 (1 THORPE
538); DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. I, § 9 (1 THORPE 583); FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, §
9 (2 THORPE 686); ILu. CONST. of 1848, art. I, § 12 (2 THORPE 1008); IND. CONST.
of 1851, art I, § 12 (2 THORPE 1074); KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. I, § 18 (2 THORPE
1243); Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 15 (3 THORPE 1313); LA. CONST. Of 1864, tit.
VII, art. 110 (3 THORPE 1442); ME. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 19 (3 THORPE 1648);
MD. CONST. of 1864, Declaration of Rights, art. 19 (3 THORPE 1743); MASs.
CoNsT. of 1780, pt. I, XI (3 THORPE 1891); MINN. CoNST. of 1857, art. I, § 8 (4
THORPE 1992); Miss. CONST. of 1836, art. I, § 14 (4 THORPE 2050); Mo. CONST. of
1865, art. I, § 15 (4 THORPE 2193); N.H. CONST. of 1792, art. XIV (4 THORPE 2473);
N.C. CoNsT. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, IX (5 THORPE 2787); OHio CONST. of
1851, art. I, § 16 (5 THORPE 2915); ORE. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 10 (5 THORPE
2999); PA. CONST. of 1838, art. IX, § 11 (5 THORPE 3114); R.I. CONST. of 1848, art.
I, § 5 (5 THORPE 3223); TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. I, § 17 (6 THORPE 3427); TEx.
CoNsT. of 1866, art. I, § 11 (6 THORPE 3571); VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. 2, § 4 (6
THORPE 3764); WIs. CONST. of 1848, art. I. § 9 (7 THORPE 4078). Georgia's con-
stitution contained a provision calling for the administration of justice openly
and without delay, but which appeared in a slightly different form. GA.
CoNsT. of 1864, art. I, § 7 (2 THORPE 810).
114. ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 10 (1 THORPE 308); S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 15
(6 THORPE 3282); W. VA. CONST. of 1872, art. I, § 17 (7 THORPE 4037). California
enacted a "Maxim of Jurisprudence" in 1872 that "[f] or every wrong there is a
remedy." CAT Civ. CODE § 3523 (March 21, 1872).
115. COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. II, § 6 (1 THORPE 475); IDAHO CONST. of 1889, art. I,
§ 18 (2 THORPE 920); MoNT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 6 (4 THORPE 2302); N.D.
CoNsT. of 1889, art. I, § 22 (5 THORPE 2856); S.D. CONST. of 1889, art. VI, § 20 (6
THORPE 3371); UTAH CONST. of 1895, art I, § 11 (6 THORPE 3703); WASH. CONST.
of 1889, art. I, § 10 (7 THORPE 3974); Wyo. CONST. of 1889, art. I, § 8 (7 THORPE
4118). Of the final five states to be admitted to the Union, two included consti-
tutional provisions for a remedy by due course of law and justice adminis-
tered without delay. ARiz. CONST. of 1910, art II, § 11; OKLA. CONST. of 1907,
art. , § 6 (7 THORPE 4273).
116. The Briefs for the Plaintiff In Error in each case contain many citations. The
Briefs are in 257 Nebraska Briefs (Neb. State Lib.). For federal cases, see
Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 14, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Hon, 66 Neb. 555, 92
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braska apparently adopted its constitutional language, as sus-
taining the validity of the New York Standard Form clause.
Commissioner Pound, therefore, might well have taken the same
position on Commissioner Oldham's reliance on the judicial rem-
edy provision as on his reliance on the right to a trial by jury provi-
sion.
B. Consequences of Choosing a Constitutional Basis
Commissioner Pound may not have perceived the full impact of
placing the decision on the constitution rather than on common
law grounds. His statements that "[w] ere the question a new one,
I do not believe this court would take the stand to which it is now
committed"" 8 and that "[t]he rule in question has been an-
nounced so many times,""19 indicate that he may not have under-
stood the full consequences of the decision in Phoenix Insurance.
The constitutional issue had not been previously decided. The Ne-
braska Constitution was not referred to in any previous decision or
in the briefs of the parties. No similar case from any other jurisdic-
tion was cited in the opinion as authority for placing such a holding
on a state constitutional basis.
Commissioner Pound was apparently considering the effect of
the substantial precedents from other states drawing the common
law distinction between clauses requiring arbitration of the dam-
age issue only and clauses requiring arbitration of all matters. As
a matter of constitutional law, there would appear to be no reason
for the Nebraska Court to have treated the issue any differently.
In fact, Commissioners Kirkpatrick and Oldham may have relied
on the Nebraska constitutional provisions for the first time simply
because the past dicta of the Nebraska decisions were directly con-
trary to the common law precedents. Normally, the common law
precedents would be followed, as a matter of stare decisis and as a
result of the statute adopting "so much of the common law of En-
gland as is applicable and not inconsistent" with the Nebraska con-
stitution or statutes.120 The 1902 Commissioners' opinions
N.W. 746 (1902); Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 13-15, 30-34, Phoenix Ins. Co. v.
Zlotky, 66 Neb. 584, 92 N.W. 736 (1902). For state cases, see Hartford Brief at
14-16; Phoenix Brief at 15-18, 34-50. For English cases, see Hartford Brief at
14; Phoenix Brief at 18-22.
117. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carnahan, 63 Ohio St. 258, 58 N.E. 805 (1900).
118. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 66 Neb. 584, 588, 92 N.W. 736, 737 (1902) (Pound, C.,
concurring).
119. Id. at 589. 92 N.W. at 737-38.
120. NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-101 (Reissue 1974). This provision was adopted by the
first Territorial Legislature on March 16, 1855. 1855 Neb. Terr. Laws (1st
Sess.) 328 (1 Comp. Sess. Laws 144 (1855-1865)).
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represented the first holdings on an arbitration of damages only
clause when the court had not been provided an alternative ground
for decision,121 and they were the first opinions to rely on the Ne-
braska Constitution.
In January 1903, the month after Phoenix Insurance, Commis-
sioner Oldham of Department 2, with Commissioners Pound and
Barnes concurring, held in Randall v. Gross122 that the arbitration
feature of the herd laws was constitutional. Plaintiff brought re-
plevin for three hogs which had trespassed on defendant's culti-
vated lands and which defendant was holding to enforce the lien of
the herd laws. Plaintiff contended that the herd laws, and in par-
ticular the arbitration provisions, were unconstitutional in that
"they oust courts of a proper jurisdiction by compelling arbitration
of the amount of damage .... -123 Plaintiff also argued that the
statutes were an unconstitutional taking of property without due
process of law under the state and federal constitutions.
Without citing Phoenix Insurance or Hartford Fire, the court
found the statutes valid in that the lien provided was a cumulative
remedy in rem against the trespassing stock and did not eliminate
the common law rights of either party; the procedure was optional
with both parties; the owner could recover the animals by tender-
ing money as security or as a confession of judgment; and dissatis-
fied parties could appeal to a justice of the peace.124 This may have
been stretching the meaning of these statutes to avoid a constitu-
tional issue. Interestingly, after failing to follow the precedents of
other states in Phoenix Insurance and Hartford Fire, the opinion
concluded:
[A] nd an examination of the adjudications of sister states on statutes sim-
ilar in kind leads us to the conclusion that where the statute makes rea-
sonable provisions and gives an opportunity for judicial investigation and
provides for notice, either personal or by publication, to the owner of the
trespassing animals before final judgment, the strong trend of authority is
to hold that such statutes constitute a reasonable procedure in the nature
of an action in rem against trespassing stock, and that proceedings under
them are due process of law, and not in conflict with constitutional guaran-tees.125
121. Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254, 86 N.W. 1085 (1901); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Sim-
mons, 49 Neb. 811, 69 N.W. 125 (1896); Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 47 Neb.
138, 66 N.W. 278 (1896); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Bachler, 44 Neb. 549, 62
N.W. 911 (1895); National Masonic Accident Ass'n v. Burr, 44 Neb. 256,62 N.W.
466 (1895); Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Eddy, 36 Neb. 461, 54 N.W. 856 (1893); Ger-
man-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 505, 41 N.W. 406 (1889); German
Ins. Co. v. Eddy, 36 Neb. 461, 54 N.W. 856 (1893); Union Ins. Co. v. Barwick, 36
Neb. 223, 54 N.W. 519 (1893).
122. 67 Neb. 255, 93 N.W. 223 (1903).
123. Id. at 260, 93 N.W. at 224.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 261-62, 93 N.W. at 225 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 58:438
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION
In 1905, after Commissioner Pound had departed to become
Dean of the University of Nebraska College of Law, Commissioner
Oldham rejected a defense to a building construction contract of
failure to arbitrate the amount of damage caused by delays in de-
fendant's performance of stone work on the foundation and walls
of the building. 26 Citing Schrandt, Phoenix Insurance (but not
Hartford Fire), and some of the earlier insurance decisions, the
opinion stated simply: "It is a rule, too well established in this
court to require any further examination, that an unexecuted
agreement to arbitrate will not be recognized or enforced in this
jurisdiction."' 27
Commissioner Pound recognized that the rule of Phoenix
Insurance is a "peculiar doctrine" but stated that it "works no
harm," "is by no means a bad rule" and there is "no reason to be-
lieve that it operates unjustly."' 28 The harm caused by the deci-
sion is in grounding the result in the Nebraska Constitution. That
determination precludes the other agencies of government from
any role in the policy determinations regarding arbitration. It ren-
ders the legislature, courts, and administrative agencies, as well as
the parties, unable to fashion any accommodations of the various
interests which might foster a policy of non-judicial dispute resolu-
tion based upon an enforceable voluntary agreement.
More than a half century later, Roscoe Pound, then one of the
nation's leading jurisprudential writers, stated:
But in recent times the exigencies of business have brought about an in-
creasing demand for commercial arbitration and there has been judicial
reconsideration of the received teaching as well as legislative provision for
a system of arbitration in almost all common-law jurisdictions....
[Dlissatisfaction with juries as triers of fact in commercial litigation and
the long delays due to congested dockets of the courts in metropolitan
commercial centers led increasingly to legislation not only removing the
common-law rule but making elaborate provision for arbitration proce-
dure, staying of actions brought in contravention of arbitration clause or
submission, specific performance of such agreements, and enforcement of
awards. Arbitration is now definitely established as an extra-judicial rem-
edy in commercial cases.... That commercial arbitration is a useful in-
strumentality of justice is demonstrated. 129
One of the major recommendations of the Chief Justice of the
United States, Warren E. Burger, at a National Conference com-
memorating the seventieth anniversary of Roscoe Pound's famous
speech, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With The Adminis-
126. Havens v. Robertson, 75 Neb. 205, 106 N.W. 335 (1905).
127. Id. at 207, 106 N.W. at 336.
128. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 66 Neb. 584,589,92 N .W. 736,738 (1902) (Pound, C.,
concurring). For text of Statement, see text accompanying note 110 supra.
129. 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENC E 358-59 (1959).
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tration of Justice,130 was that "the well-developed forms of arbitra-
tion should have wider use.1 31 Unfortunately, in Nebraska
arbitration arrangements must first clear a constitutional hurdle
which Roscoe Pound in his younger years helped to create.
VI. THE LAW SINCE 1902
Since 1902, the Nebraska Supreme Court has consistently ap-
plied rules that executory arbitration agreements are unenforce-
able132 but that arbitration awards are binding except for fraud or
mistake. 3 3 The court has not defined the nature and extent of the
130. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With The Administration of
Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906) (reprinted in abridged form, 57 A.B.AJ. 348
(1971)).
131. W. Burger, Agenda For 2000 A.D.-Need for Systematic Anticipation 11 (April
7, 1976) (unpublished, available from Public Information Office, Supreme
Court of the United States). Chief Justice Burger noted.
As the work of the courts increases, delays and costs will rise and
the well-developed forms of arbitration should have wider use. Law-
yers, judges and social scientists of other countries cannot under-
stand our failure to make greater use of the arbitration process to
settle disputes. I submit a reappraisal of the values of the arbitration
process is in order, to determine whether, like the Administrative
Procedures Act, arbitration can divert litigation to other channels.
The Chief Justice has continued to pursue this recommendation. Address by
Chief Justice Burger, ABA Minor Disputes Resolution Conference 5-6 (May
27, 1977) (unpublished, available from Public Information Office, Supreme
Court of the United States); W. Burger, Year-End Report on the Judiciary 5-6
(January 1, 1978); W. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary 12
(Address at Midyear Meeting of ABA, February 12, 1978). The Chief Justice
has recently stated.
But we must now turn to explore more fully the utilization of arbi-
tration as an alternative in large commercial conflicts and other
claims, a procedure widely employed for so long in many other coun-
tries. Much study will be required, for example, to determine
whether, independent of any contract, litigants may be compelled to
exhaust arbitration methods before resorting to the courts. It is not
clear whether that kind of procedure would be enforceable by sanc-
tions imposed upon litigants who refuse to resort to arbitration. Ob-
viously, the guarantees of the Constitution must be respected in this
area as they are elsewhere.
Id. at 12.
132. Poppert v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 187 Neb. 297, 189 N.W.2d 469 (1971)
(collective bargaining agreement); Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 169 N.W.2d
606 (1969) (uninsured motorist insurance); Johnson v. Munsell, 170 Neb. 749,
104 N.W.2d 314 (1960) (partnership agreement); Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake
& Meal Co., 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d 657 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 812 (1951)
(contract for sale and delivery of soybean oil); Rentschler v. Missouri Pac.
R.R, 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934) (collective bargaining agreement);
Markham v. Independent Order of Foresters, 78 Neb. 295, 110 N.W. 638 (1907)
(fraternal insurance society); Havens v. Robertson, 75 Neb. 205, 106 N.W. 335
(1905) (building construction contract).
133. Simpson v. Simpson, 194 Neb. 453, 232 N.W.2d 132 (1975); Hughes v. Sarpy
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invalidity of agreements to arbitrate. The effect of the law of an-
other jurisdiction, especially federal law, is yet to be set forth.
Whether the prohibition covers nonjudicial matters is not clear.
And the court has not yet ruled on whether new legislative rights
not in derogation of common law may include binding arbitration.
Nebraska contracts may be subject to the substantive law of an-
other jurisdiction which recognizes arbitration agreements. An ar-
bitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement covered by
Nebraska law is unenforceable, 134 but an arbitration agreement by
Nebraska parties covered by Section 301 of the federal labor law 35
is enforceable in federal courts. 136 The United States Arbitration
Act provides:
A writtan provision in any... contract evidencing a transaction involv-
ing commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an ex-
isting controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.137
A contract entered into in interstate commerce or pursuant to a
federal statute is enforceable in federal courts notwithstanding
state constitutional provisions 38 or other law to the contrary.139
County, 97 Neb. 90, 149 N.W. 309 (1914); In re Arbitration of Johnson, 87 Neb.
375, 127 N.W. 133 (1910). In Simpson, the court statedh
They decided to end their argument, not by going to court, but by
providing that a vote of two-thirds of the appraisers should become
final and binding on each party. Under the settled law, such an
agreement and such a settled purpose does not permit a post-ap-
praisal reargument as to whether the arbitrators were precisely cor-
rect as to the minute details of the division which the arbitration
contract provided for. The fundamental purpose of the arbitration
agreement was to accomplish a division of the property, and not to
set up the arbitrators' decision as a further and additional ground for
court dispute.
194 Neb. at 458, 232 N.W. at 137.
134. Poppert v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 187 Neb. 297, 189 N.W.2d 469 (1971);
Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
136. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See also Bricklayers v.
Lueder Constr. Co., 346 F. Supp. 558 (D. Neb. 1972).
137. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
138. Arkoosh v. Dean Witter & Co., 415 F. Supp. 535, 538 n.3 (D. Neb. 1976):
While the parties have not raised the issue in their arguments it
would appear that under Nebraska law arbitration clauses, such as
the one involved in this case, are unenforceable under Article I, Sec-
tion 13 of the Constitution of Nebraska .... However, the contract
involved in the present case, is one "evidencing a transaction involv-
ing commerce" and is, therefore, subject to the terms of 9 U.S.C.A. § 1
et seq. under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.
See Booth v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 212,215 (8th Cir. 1970)
(declining to rule whether an insurance contract is a transaction involving
commerce).
139. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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It is not clear whether suit can be brought in Nebraska state
courts to enforce an arbitration agreement authorized under fed-
eral law, or whether failure to arbitrate under such an agreement
can be relied upon as a defense in Nebraska state courts. If the
federal labor law, Arbitration Act or other statute is treated as cre-
ating substantive rights, 14o it would seem that those rights would
be enforceable under the constitutional jurisdiction of Nebraska
district courts.14 ' The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected a failure
to arbitrate defense in Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co. 142
for the reason that "in the courts of this state the issue is one of
procedure and not of substantive right, and the laws of this state
are controlling."143 That decision, however, was rendered before
the United States Supreme Court had attached prime substantive
importance to arbitration agreements. 144
The same general problem would appear to exist with respect
to Nebraska state court enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate
entered into under the laws of a state recognizing such agree-
ments, or an agreement choosing the law of another state to govern
a "Nebraska contract."' 45 If the enforcement or defense pertains
to a matter of '"procedure," the Nebraska courts probably would
not give effect to the arbitration agreement. 46 If the matter is
treated as "substantive," the arbitration agreement would presum-
ably be respected unless the court reasons that the provision of-
fends a strong public policy of Nebraska. 47
If all the Nebraska Supreme Court has done is to strike down
agreements ousting the courts of their jurisdiction, arbitration ar-
rangements pertaining to nonjudicial matters may be enforceable.
For example, voluntary arrangements to arrive at a contract rather
140. Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
141. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 9; NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-302 (Reissue 1975).
142. 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d 657 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 812 (1951).
143. Id. (syllabus of the court, not restated in the same language in the text of the
opinion: "Where arbitration constitutes a part of the contract between par-
ties to it and an attempt is made to enforce arbitration by invoking the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, in the courts of this state the issue is one of procedure
and not of substantive right .... ").
144. See notes 136, 139-40 & accompanying text supra.
145. See A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 153-54 (1962 ed.).
146. Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d 657 (1950),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 812 (1951). 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCTS
§ 219 (1971).
147. Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d 657 (1950),




than remedy its breach (sometimes referred to as "interest arbitra-
tion") might be valid in Nebraska. Under traditional Restatement
of Contracts'48 rules, this type of agreement would be enforceable
(but so would an agreement to arbitrate the amount of loss under
an insurance policy' 49): "A promises to sell an automobile to B at
whatever price valuers to be selected by them shall fix, and B
promises to buy the machine at that price. The bargain is legal."' 50
In addition, a provision in a will that a beneficiary have an option
to purchase real estate at its fair market value to be fixed by a
named appraiser is valid and enforceable.' 5 '
The Nebraska Court does not appear to have considered the
possible distinction between an arbitration agreement to remedy a
breach and an arbitration agreement to arrive at a substantial con-
dition of the contract.15 2 In Johnson v. Munsell, 53 the parties to a
partnership agreement had provided that upon the death of one
partner, the remaining partners could buy the deceased's interest.
In the event of a failure to agree on price, the opinion states, "then
within a reasonable time its value should be determined by the
surviving partners and the representative of the owner of the de-
ceased partner's share, each selecting an appraiser and the two ap-
praisers selecting a third, with survivors having an option to
purchase said share by paying the amount of such appraisal." 5 4
In a single paragraph, the court invalidated the arbitration
clause but severed it from the remainder of the partnership agree-
ment which was enforced. Relying on Phoenix Insurance, the
court stated:
With regard to the matter of the appraisal by approved appraisers, we may
assume that an unexecuted agreement to arbitrate will not ordinarily be
recognized by the courts of this state because the effect thereof would be
148. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 551 (1932).
149. Id. § 551(2) & Comment a, Illustration 2.
150. Id. § 551(3) & Comment a, Illustration 3.
151. Overbeck v. Bock, 198 Neb. 121, 251 N.W.2d 872 (1977).
152. But Wilbur F. Bryant, Deputy Reporter of the Nebraska Supreme Court, may
have foreseen this possibility in the note which follows the Phoenix
Insurance opinions in the Nebraska Reports only. The note states:
A clause in a contract agreeing generally to submit all of the ques-
tions that might arise under the contract to arbitration, is void, the
same being against public policy, because the effect is to oust the
jurisdiction of the courts. Nevertheless, it is competent for parties to
stipulate in a contract that the value of property contracted to be sold
or delivered shall be ascertained or fixed by arbitrators chosen for
the purpose. Such special stipulations in contracts, relating to the
manner in which the value of things forming the subject-matter of
the contract shall be ascertained, are valid.
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 66 Neb. 584, 589 (1902).
153. 170 Neb. 749, 104 N.W.2d 314 (1960).
154. Id. at 755-56, 104 N.W.2d at 319.
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to oust the courts of their legitimate jurisdiction.... However that may
be, such assumption will not avoid enforcement by courts of the valid pro-
visions of the partnership agreement or affect the result under the circum-
stances presented herein.
1 5
The court then examined several issues pertaining to the valuation
of decedent's interest in the partnership and affirmed the findings
of the lower court on those issues.
There is no indication how the court would have proceeded in
Johnson had there not been a complete agreement without the ar-
bitration feature. It might have required the arbitration to be car-
ried out on the theory that the traditional jurisdiction of the courts
was not being ousted and that there is a public policy in favor of
carrying out contractual obligations. Perhaps, the court would rea-
son that the judicial remedy provision of the constitution, itself,
requires that the arbitration be enforced, since, otherwise, the de-
cedent's representatives would have a contractual right without
any remedy. The court might choose to consider the arbitration
clause "void"'156 and the purported agreement incomplete and inef-
fective. Or, the court might, itself, establish the substantive term
on the basis that the underlying agreement of the parties was one
of "reasonableness" which is subject to judicial determination,
much like the court essentially did in Johnson.
In this context, the court has yet to draw the line between an
agreement to arbitrate and an agreement on a condition. A sale or
agreement subject to an external objective contingency or factor is
a valid contract.157 However, a sale or agreement subject to discre-
tionary approval by a third party, such as an architect or appraiser,
of a material element of the contract' 5 8 might fall within the prohi-
bition against arbitration agreements. If this strict view is pur-
sued, many common forms of business agreements might be in
jeopardy.
There is an additional problem with respect to legislative ar-
rangements which involve matters not in derogration of common
law rights. It may be that these new statutory subjects can include
binding arbitration mechanisms in that they do not oust the courts
of traditional judicial functions.
155. Id. at 756, 104 N.W.2d at 319.
156. The traditional black letter rule states that "the condition is void." See, e.g.,
German-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 505, 508, 41 N.W. 406 (1889).
157. See Fairchild v. Fairchild, 176 Neb. 95, 125 N.W.2d 191 (1963).
158. Although the existence of an agreement, itself, can be conditioned upon the
assent of a third person, it is probably not enforceable under the general law
of contracts until the assent is given. See O'Brien v. Fricke, 148 Neb. 369, 27
N.W.2d 403 (1947); Evans v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 144 Neb. 368,
13 N.W.2d 401 (1944).
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The herd law decision 159 might be interpreted to imply that a
statutory lien procedure could be conditioned upon arbitration so
long as common law rights are not required to be surrendered. If
this is the case, then arguably the Court of Industrial Relations'
jurisdiction to settle industrial disputes can be interpreted to in-
clude enforcement of arbitration agreements since these public
employment collective bargaining agreements stem solely from re-
cent state statutes. 160 On the same theory, other Nebraska courts
as well might be required to fully enforce public employment arbi-
tration agreements. The force of this argument is substantially
weakened, however, by the supreme court's strongly worded opin-
ion invalidating arbitration clauses in uninsured motorist insur-
ance.161
If there are new statutory areas in which enforceable arbitra-
tion agreements can be entered into, those areas will be difficult to
define. The corporation laws, for example, may present a justifica-
tion for arbitration agreements pertaining to dissension and dead-
lock in management since those matters are not traditionally dealt
with in court. The appraisal rights given dissenting state bank and
state trust company shareholders upon reorganization as a na-
tional bank162 might fall into the same category. Similarly, in-
trafamily disputes might be settled by an agreement to arbitrate
matters not ousting the courts from whatever could be settled judi-
cially.
159. Randall v. Gross, 67 Neb. 225, 93 N.W. 223 (1903). See notes 52-54, 122-25 &
accompanying text supra.
160. The Court of Industrial Relations has indicated that as a matter of discretion,
it will decline to exercise its jurisdiction to settle an industrial dispute where
a contractually agreed arbitration of the issue is available to the parties. See
Transit Workers v. Transit Auth., 3 Neb. C.IR. Adv. 469 (1978). This is similar
to a position of the National Labor Relations Board. See Collyer Insulated
Wire, 192 N.L.RB. 837 (1971). But the Court of Industrial Relations has not
yet ordered enforcement of an arbitration clause.
161. Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 606, 169 N.W.2d 606, 609-10 (1969):
Assaults on the doctrine of the invalidity of an arbitration clause
are continually reasserted in new contexts in the development of the
law. It is asserted that the novel situation present in the scheme of
uninsured motorist's coverage permits an application of the doctrine
without the violation of the public policy principles upon which the
doctrine is founded. ...
[ iT]he compulsory arbitration clause involved in this insur-
ance policy and considered in the context of an uninsured motorist's
coverage is void and of no force and effect because it contravenes
public policy expressed in German-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton,
... in that it operates "to oust the courts of their legitimate jurisdic-
tion."
162. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-182, 8-229 (Reissue 1977).
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VII. CONCLUSION
None of the unsettled areas of Nebraska law concerning volun-
tary arbitration agreements would be particularly bothersome
were it not for the fact that the impediments are constitutional in
nature. The constitutional basis was wrongly arrived at by the
Commissioners in 1902. But until that judicial determination is
changed or the Nebraska Constitution amended, it will prohibit or
endanger some very useful and beneficial arbitration arrange-
ments. Once the constitutional obstacles are removed, there is no
reason why the legislature, courts and administrative agencies will
not be able to design and enforce a system under which people can
agree upon their own method for resolving disputes which may
arise out of their transactions.
